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ISSUE ON APPEAL
Eugene L. Perry, as personal representative of the
Estate of Diane Laura McLaughlin, petitioned the Third Judicial
District Probate Court for an order vacating the court's
earlier December 3, 1985 Order on the ground that it was void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Was the court's

refusal to grant this petition reversible error where:

A.
Mr. Perry petitioned the probate court
in October 1985 for an order approving the
sale of estate property to Albert and Susan
Arnaud;
B.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3), which
previously provided that, when a personal
representative petitioned the court for the
approval of the sale of estate property,
"any person may appear and bid for the
property," was repealed in 1983;
C.
Kent and Carol McLaughlin appeared and
bid on the home and furnishings at the
November 6, 19 8 5 hearing;
D.
Neither Kent nor Carol McLaughlin is an
"interested person" as that term is defined
by Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20) (1978);
E.
The probate court ordered Mr. Perry to
sell the home and furnishings to the
McLaughlins (The December 3, 1985 Order);
F.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a
party must have standing as an "interested
person" to intervene in a probate court
proceeding;
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G.
Utah law provides that a probate
court's authority is statutory and that an
order entered without statutory authority is
void and should be vacated;
H.
Federal decisions uniformly hold that
it is reversible error for a federal court
to refuse to vacate an order under F.R.CP.
Rule 60(b)(4) if the order is void; and
I.
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) is identical to
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5)? :

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The Death of Diane McLaughlin and her Survivors

Diane Laura McLaughlin ("Diane") died on August 2,
1985 as a result of the crash of Delta Air Lines Flight 191 at
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. (R.24).

She was survived by her two

sons, Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin ("Shaun" and "Dustin") and
her father, Eugene L. Perry ("Mr. Perry"). (R.7, 238). Diane
was the legal custodian of Shaun and Dustin at the time of her
death. (R.41).

Diane was also survived by her former husband, Kent
McLaughlin, the father of Shaun and Dustin. (R.40-41).
his divorce from Diane, Mr. McLaughlin had remarried.
wife's name is Carol McLaughlin. (R.168).
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After
His

The Appointment of a Conservator for Shaun and Dustin
And a Personal Representative for Diane's Estate

After Diane's death, her father, Mr. Perry, petitioned
the Third Judicial District Probate Court for an order
appointing Commercial Security Bank conservator for Shaun and
Dustin.

The probate court granted that petition on September

4, 1985, in Probate No. P-85-837.

After its appointment, Commercial Security Bank
nominated Mr.Perry to act as personal representative of the
Estate of Diane Laura McLaughlin. (R.5).

The probate court

granted Mr. Perry's petition for appointment as personal
representative of Diane's intestate estate on September 25,
1985, in Probate No. P-85-893. (R.13-15).

Mr. Perry Acts to Sell Diane's Home

Other than a wrongful death claim against Delta Air
Lines and others, the single most valuable asset in Diane's
estate was her home and her personal property located in the
home. (R.39).

After his appointment, Mr. Perry listed the home

for sale with a real estate agent. (R.376).
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Kent McLaughlin's Offer to Waive his Equitable
Interest in Diane's Home

Shortly after Diane's death, Kent McLaughlin told Mr.
Perry that Mr. McLaughlin was willing to waive his equitable
lien against Diane's home (approximating $2,500.00). (R.41).
Mr. McLaughlin obtained the equitable lien as part of the
decree of divorce from Diane. (R.40).

The amount of the lien

had been reduced pursuant to a written agreement between Mr.
McLaughlin and Diane in January 1984. (R.40, 50-53).

Mr. Perry Petitions the Court for Approval
of the Sale of the Home to the Arnauds

In October, 1985, Albert and Susan Arnaud presented an
offer to purchase Diane's home and certain furnishings located
in the home. (R.46-49, 54). Mr. Perry determined that the
offer was reasonable. (R.38-44).

However, Mr. McLaughlin's

oral waiver of his equitable lien was not of record.

As a

result, Mr. Perry could not pass clear title without court
approval of the oral waiver.

Thus, Mr. Perry accepted the

Arnaud's offer subject to probate court approval. (R.47).
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On October 15, 1985, Mr. Perry filed a petition for
approval of the sale of the home and the furnishings to the
Arnauds and for the approval of Mr. McLaughlin's oral waiver of
his lien. (R.38-54).

However, prior to the hearing Mr.

McLaughlin filed a written objection to Mr. Perry's petition,
withdrawing his oral waiver. (R.55-56).

At the hearing, the Court Opened the Proceedings
For Bids on Diane's Home and Furnishings

The probate court heard Mr. Perry's petition on
November 6, 1985, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding.
(R.62).

E. H. Fankhauser appeared at the hearing as attorney

for Kent and Carol McLaughlin. (R.62)

When the matter was

called, the court, mistakenly acting pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-710(3) (repealed 1983), asked for higher and better bids
with regard to the home and the furnishings located within the
home. (R.77-78).

The McLaughlins moved the court to order Mr.

Perry to sell the home and furnishings to them at the price
they offered. (R.77-78).

The court determined that Kent and

Carol McLaughlin's offer for the home and the furnishings was a
better offer and ordered the home and the furnishings sold to
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the McLaughlins. (R.369-386).

While Mr. Perry objected to the

court's actions on other grounds, he did not object to the
granting of the petition on the basis that Subsection
75-3-710(3) had been repealed. (R.369-386).

Counsel for Mr.

Perry was not aware of the repeal at the hearing. (R.241).

The December 3, 1985 Order Required the McLaughlins
To Purchase the Home and Furnishings on or before
December 1, 1985

The court entered its written order on December 3,
1985. (R.77-81).

Counsel for Mr. Perry participated in the

drafting of the order. (R.66-81).

The December 3, 1985 Order

required the McLaughlins to purchase the home and furnishings
on or before December 1, 1985. (R.80).

The McLaughlins

tendered a check for the furnishings prior to December 1, 1985.
(R.267).

However, the McLaughlins were unable to close on the

home. (R.187, 265-266).

On the advice of counsel, Mr. Perry

took the position that the court's order required the
McLaughlins to purchase both the home and the furnishings as a
package. (R.208, 233). When the McLaughlins were unable to
close on the home, pursuant to the advice of counsel, Mr. Perry
sold the home and the furnishings to Albert and Susan Arnaud on
December 13, 1985. (R.208, 232).
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The McLaughlins Obtain an Order to Show Cause

Thereafter, on December 27, 1985, the McLaughlins obtained
ex parte an order to show cause why the personal representative
should not be reguired to deliver the furnishings to Kent and
Carol McLaughlin, (R.122-123, 126-127).

The McLaughlins

scheduled a hearing on their Order to Show Cause for January
15, 1986 before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. (R.126).

Judge

Hanson was reassigned from the Third District's probate
calendar as of January 1, 1986 and Judge Rigtrup replaced him.
(R.126).

Mr. Perry Seeks to Amend or Vacate the
December 3, 1985 Order; Judge Rigtrup
Refuses to Hear his Petition

Prior to the hearing date, Mr. Perry filed a petition
with the probate court requesting that the court amend the
December 3, 1985 Order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (1983). (R.100-103).

At the hearing on

January 15, 1986, Judge Rigtrup advised Mr. Perry that he would
not hear the Rule 60(b) petition because the order it sought to
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amend or vacate was entered by another district court judge.
(R.241).

As a result, Mr. Perry requested a continuance in

order to attempt to consolidate before Judge Hanson his Rule
60(b) petition with the McLaughlins' order to show cause.
(R.241, 109-114).

Judge Rigtrup granted Mr. Perry's request

for a continuance but entered an unsigned minute entry in which
he stated that the December 3, 1985 Order entitled the
McLaughlins to the furnishings and that the furnishings should
be delivered to Kent and Carol McLaughlin. (R.131-132).

The Amended Petition to Amend or Vacate the
December 3, 1985 Order; the Court Hears the Petition

On January 20, 1986, Mr. Perry filed an amended petition
for a Rule 60(b) order and noticed the petition to be heard
before Judge Hanson. (R.179-184).

On the day of the hearing,

E. H. Fankhauser, counsel for the McLaughlins, filed his own
affidavit with the court in which he made various allegations
of misfeasance on the part of Mr. Perry and his counsel.
(R.168-175).

The matter was argued to the court on February 10,
1986. (R.154).

At the hearing, Mr. Perry moved to strike the
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affidavit from Mr. Fankhauser on the basis that, among other
reasons, it was untimely under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R.154).

Mr. Perry also moved the court to certify under Rule

54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983) the order
entered as a final order in the event the court did not amend
or vacate the December 3, 1985 Order. (R.165-166).

The court

denied the petition in so far as it sought to amend the
December 3, 1985 Order, but it reserved judgment on all other
matters (including the prayer that the order be vacated as
void) and took those matters under advisement. (R.154).

On

February 25, 1986, Judge Hanson entered his Memorandum
Decision. (R.156-167).

The Court's Memorandum Decision Denies Mr. Perry's
Petition

In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Hanson ruled that,
notwithstanding the repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) in 1983,
the court had general authority under the probate code to
follow the procedure which had been followed at the November 6,
1985 hearing. (R.163).

Therefore, Judge Hanson ruled the

December 3, 1985 Order was not void because of the repeal of
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Subsection 75-3-710(3). (R.165).

He further weighed the

equities between the parties based only on the allegations
contained in Mr. Fankhauser's affidavit and decided that Mr.
Perry was not entitled to equitable relief under Rule 60(b).
(Re 164-165).

Based on the Memorandum Decision, the court

entered a written order on March 12, 1986 denying Mr. Perry's
Rule 60(b) Petition. (R.190-192).

The court also denied Mr.

Perry's oral motion to certify the order under Rule 54(b).
(R.191).

Mr. Perry Petitions the Court to Amend its Order
and Certify the Order under Rule 54(b)

On March 24, 1986, Mr. Perry filed a petition under
Rule 59(a) asking the court to amend its March 12, 1986 Order
as a manifest error of law. (R.200-204).

In addition, Mr.

Perry again asked the court to strike Mr. Fankhauser's
affidavit and filed counter affidavits disputing his
allegations. (R.193-194, 229-247).

The two principal points

raised in the Rule 59(a) petition were first, Kent and Carol
McLaughlin were not "interested persons", and as such did not
have standing to move the court for an order at the November 6,
1985 hearing. (R.201).

Second, Mr. Perry asked the court to

certify the Order under Rule 54(b). (R.202).
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The court heard

Mr. Perry's petition on April 7. (R.251).

The court agreed to

certify the March 12th order under Rule 54(b). (R.251).
However, the court otherwise confirmed the original order.
(R.251).

The court entered the amending order on July 9, 1986.

(R.293-294).

Mr. Perry now appeals the March 12th Order, as

amended. (R.298-299).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The probate court entered its December 3, 1985 Order
pursuant to the motion of persons who are not "interested
persons" under the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

When it did so,

the probate court exceeded its subject matter jurisdictional
authority.

An order outside the jurisdictional authority of

the probate court is void and should be vacated.

When the

probate court refused to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order
pursuant to Mr. Perry's Rule 60(b)(5) motion, the probate court
! committed reversible error.
H

Thus, the Court should reverse the

i<

|j probate court's decision and remand the case to the probate
court with directions to enter an order vacating the December
3, 1985 Order.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ordinarily, in order to reverse a district court
judge's decision made pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, the
appellant must show that the judge abused his discretion.

Laub

v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1304,
1306 (Utah 1982).

However, the federal courts have

consistently held that a trial judge's refusal to vacate a void
order pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1985) is reversible error.

There is

no need to show an abuse of discretion:
There is no question of discretion on the part of the
court when a motion is [made] under Rule 60(b)(4) [of
the Federal Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e ] . . . . Either a
judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it
is may well present a difficult question, but when
that question is resolved, the court must act
accordingly.
C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2862
(1973) (emphasis added).

Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (1985) is identical to Rule 60(b)(5) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983).

Accordingly, if Mr.

Perry can show that the order of December 3, 1985 was void, the
Court should reverse the March 12, 1986 Order and direct Judge
Hanson to enter an order vacating his December 3, 1985 Order.
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a

ARGUMENT

I.

THE PROBATE COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTIONAL

| AUTHORITY BY GRANTING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF TO KENT AND CAROL
I MCLAUGHLIN; NEITHER KENT NOR CAROL MCLAUGHLIN HAD STANDING TO
|| MOVE THE PROBATE COURT FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AT THE NOVEMBER
|| 6, 1985 HEARING,

A.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code Requires that a Person

jj have Standing as an "Interested Person" in order to Participate
jJ in Probate Proceedings.

j

It is axiomatic under Utah law that "a party must

Ji demonstrate standing to raise an issue in order to secure a
j ruling thereon."

Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, 624

i1

j P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981); accord, Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
j| 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
j] this principle.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code codified

Subsection 75-3-105(1) limits those who may

j|
]] seek formal orders to "persons interested in the decedent's
|| estate." Utah Code Ann.S 75-3-105 (1978).
{!

The Supreme Court has recently considered whether a person

II who was not an "interested person" could intervene in a probate

i
!

j
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proceeding.
(Utah 1986)•

Matter of the Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801
In Peterson, the Court stated:

"When a statute

creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue
under it, none except those designated may sue."
P.2d at 803.

Peterson, 716

Thus, the Court held that the party seeking to

intervene in Peterson was precluded from doing so because that
party did not come within the definition of "interested person"
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803.

Accordingly, the definition of "interested person" is
crucial to determine whether a person has a right to
participate in probate proceedings.

An "interested person" is

defined to include:
heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and others having a property right in
or a claim against a trust estate or the estate of a
decedent . . . .
It also includes persons having
priority for appointment as personal representative
and other fiduciaries representing interested
persons. The meaning as it relates to particular
persons may vary from time to time and must be
determined according to the particular purposes of,
and matters involved in, any proceeding.
Utah Code Ann.S 75-1-201(20) (1978).
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B.

Neither Kent nor Carol McLaughlin is an "Interested

Person"; thus, the McLaughlins did not have Standing to Move
the Probate Court for Affirmative Relief.

Carol McLaughlin is the present wife of Kent McLaughlin,
Diane's former husband. (R.168).
is not an "interested person."

As a result, Carol McLaughlin
She does not come within any

part of the definition.
Kent McLaughlin is an interested person with regard to his
claim against Diane's house for his $2,500.00 equitable
interest. (R.55).

However, the Utah Uniform Probate Code

specifies that a person's status as an "interested person" can
"vary from time to time and must be determined according to the
particular purposes of . . . any proceeding."
§ 75-1-201(20) (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

The purpose of the November 6, 1985

hearing was to consider Mr. Perry's petition for approval of
the sale of Diane's home to the Arnauds. (R.38-54, 62). Mr.
McLaughlin's interest in that proceeding was limited to
insuring that his equitable interest in Diane's home was fully
paid.

Kent McLaughlin had no interest with regard to the

personal property items located in the home.

Moreover, it was

not necessary for him to bid on the home in order to protect
his equitable interest.

The proposed purchase price ($62,000)
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was far in excess of Mr. McLaughlin's equitable lien
(approximately $2,500), (Compare R.39 with R.384)e

When the

home was sold in December 1985 to the Arnauds, his equitable
interest was fully paid. (R.241).

Thus, Kent McLaughlin was

not an "interested person" for purposes of bidding on Diane's
home and furniture at the November 6, 1985 hearing.
Finally, both Kent and Carol McLaughlin bid as joint
purchasers. (R.78).

Even if Kent McLaughlin were an

"interested person" for purposes of bidding on Diane's home and
furnishings, the court still permitted a non interested person
(Carol McLaughlin) to intervene in the probate proceedings, to
move the court for affirmative relief and the court granted
affirmative relief to the non interested person.

In doing so,

the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority.

C.

The Repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) in 1983 Removed

the Probate Court's Authority to Permit a Person who is not an
"Interested Person" to Bid for the Purchase of Estate Property.

Prior to its repeal in 1983, Subsection 75-3-710(3)
provided the sole exception to the rule that only "interested
persons" may participate in probate proceedings.
Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983

Utah Code

L. 1983, ch. 226,
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§ 9 ) . Subsection 75-3-710(3) provided that if the personal
representative seeks approval of the sale of estate property,
"any person may appear and bid for the property being sold . .
J . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 —

1983, ch. 226, § 9)(emphasis added).
part of the Uniform Probate Code.

L.

This subsection was not a

Compare, Uniform Probate

Code § 3-710 with Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed
1983 -- L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9 ) .
The repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) removed the only
grounds for allowing non interested persons to participate in
probate proceedings.

A statement made by the Supreme Court in

its recent decision in Peterson shows the importance of this
repeal to the present case:
(Claimant's) reliance on In Re Miles' Estate, 63 U.
144, 223 P. 337 (1924), is misplaced. Comp. Laws Utah
1917, § 7869 gave any person the right to be heard on
any question affecting a probate matter. By
comparison only personal representatives or interested
persons, as defined above, may petition for an order
of complete settlement of the Estate. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 75-3-1001(1) (1978 ed.).

I
]

j Peterson, 716 P.2d at 802 - 803; emphasis in Supreme Court's
| opinion.

Similarly, Subsection 75-3-710(3) gave any person the

right to bid on the sale of estate property at a hearing to
approve the sale of the property.

With its repeal in 1983,

only interested persons have the right to move the probate

I
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court for affirmative relief at hearings concerning petitions
for the approval of the sale of real property,

Utah Code Ann.

§ 75-3-105 (1978).

D.

The Probate Court Is a Statutory Creation and Derives

its Power Solely from the Statutes; Orders which Exceed its
Statutory Authority are Void.

Under the prior probate code, the Supreme Court has stated
that the probate court's authority is entirely statutory.
Re Cloward's Estate, 82 P.2d 336, 339 (Utah 1938).

In

In

addition, the Supreme Court has stated that an order entered by
the probate court without specific statutory authority was void
and should be vacated, In Re Harris' Estate, 105 P.2d 461, 464
(Utah 1940).

The adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code has

not vitiated the reasoning behind these cases.

The probate

court has limited jurisdictional powers and when it exceeds
those powers, its order is void.

II.

IN THIS CASE, THE PROBATE COURT FAILED TO UNDERSTAND

THE IMPORTANCE AND IMPACT OF THE REPEAL OF SUBSECTION
75-3-710(3).
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" A.

While Most of Subsection 75-3-710(3) was Duplicative

of Grants of Power Found elsewhere in the Utah Uniform Probate
Code, the Power of Non Interested Persons to Bid on the Sale of
Estate Property was Unique to Subsection 75-3-710(3).

Normally, when a statute is repealed, the courts of that
jurisdiction are immediately divested of all authority granted
to them under the repealed statute.
Statutes § 385 (1974).

See, 73 Am. Jur. 2d

However, the repeal of Subsection

75-3-710(3) in 1983 created a problem in this regard because
part of the powers granted pursuant to that subsection were
also granted elsewhere in the probate code.

The reason for

this duplication was that when Utah adopted the Uniform Probate
Code in 1977, the legislature added Subsection 75-3-710(3)
which was not a part of the Uniform Probate Code.

Compare

§ 3-710 of the Uniform Probate Code with Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-710 (1978; repealed 1983 —

L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9 ) .

When the legislature added Subsection 75-3-710(3) to the Utah
version of the Uniform Probate Code, it duplicated grants of
power which already were part of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
The problem with the probate court's decision in this case
was that the probate court ruled as if Subsection 75-3-710(3)
were entirely duplicative of other sections of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code. (R.163).

A careful review of that subsection
- 19 -
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with the other provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code
shows that this is wrong.

While parts of Subsection

75-3-710(3) were duplicative, there was one part that not only
was unique to Subsection 75-3-710(3) but was also contrary to
the entire philosophy behind the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
Subsection 75-3-710(3) provided as follows:
The personal representative may petition the court for
an order approving any sale or other matter affecting
any property of the estate which is made subject to
court approval. After notice to all interested
persons and the hearing, at which if the transaction
is a sale, any person may appear and bid for the
property being sold, the court shall enter such order
as appears to be in the best interest of the estate.
If a person interested in the estate bids for such
property, he may request that his interest in the
estate be offset against the purchase price.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 -- L. 1983,
ch. 226, § 9). As will be shown, the first, third and
(possibly) part of the second sentences are duplicative of
grants of power in other sections of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code; however, the remainder of the second sentence is unique
to Subsection 75-3-710(3).

The First Sentence

Section 75-3-704 provides in part:

"A personal

representative . . . may invoke the jurisdiction of the court
- 20 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in proceedings authorized by this code, to resolve questions
concerning the estate or its administration."
§ 75-3-704 (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

The Editorial Board Comment to this section

of the Uniform Probate Code (§ 3-704) states:

"This section is

intended to confer authority on the personal representative to
initiate a proceeding at any time when it is necessary to
resolve a question relating to administration."

Editorial

Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-704 (1978).

Thus, the

personal representative already had the authority to seek court
approval of actions with regard to estate property (including
the approval of sales) without the addition of the first
sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3).

The Third Sentence

Similarly, Subsection 75-3-105(1) provides that any
interested person "may petition the court for orders in formal
proceedings . . . including, but not limited to those described
in this chapter [Chapter 3 of Title 75, Probate of Wills and
Administration]."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978).

Thus,

if a personal representative sought approval of the sale of
estate property to a third party, an interested person did not
need the grant of authority in the last sentence of Subsection
75-3-710(3) to petition the probate court for an order
- 21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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requiring the property be sold to the interested person and
requesting that the interested person's interest in the estate
offset the purchase price.

The interested person already had

the authority to file that petition under Subsection
75-3-105(1).

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978).

The Second Sentence

However, the second sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3) is a
different situation.

The general direction that the probate

court view any petition regarding the sale of estate property
from the perspective of "the best interests of the estate" was
probably already implicit in the probate court's general grant
of jurisdiction under Subsection 75-1-302(2).

Compare Utah

Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 -- L. 1983, ch.
226, § 9) with Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978).

But

regardless of how this provision is interpreted, what really
sets the second sentence apart from the rest of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code is the provision that, when the personal
representative files a petition for the approval of the sale of
estate property, "anyone may appear and bid for the property
being sold . . .."
repealed 1983 —

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978;

L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9 ) ; emphasis added.

This

provision is not duplicative of any other grant of authority
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under the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
contrary to the rest of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. §

Rather, it is entirely

See, I, A, B and C above;

75-3-105 (1978); Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803.

As succinctly expressed in the Editorial Board Comments:
This section (section 75-3-106) and others in Chapter
3 describe a system of administration of decedents*
estates which gives interested persons control of
whether matter relating to estates will become
occasions for judicial orders.
Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. §
emphasis added.

75-3-106 (1978);

As Peterson shows, a non interested person has

no right to "control" what "matters . . . will become occasions
for judicial orders."

B.

Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803.

Unless Specific Statutory Authority is Provided to the

Contrary, the Scope of Any Proceeding Before the Probate Court
Depends upon the Prayer for Relief in the Petition before the
Court.

The Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-106 also
establishes the scope of any proceeding before the probate
court:
Nothing except self interest will compel resort to the
judge. When resort to the judge is necessary or
desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain protection,
the scope of the proceeding if not otherwise
prescribed by the Code is framed by the petition.
- 23 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106 (1978);
emphasis added.

Prior to its repeal, Subsection 75-3-710(3)

provided the only exception to the Utah Uniform Probate Code's
rule that only an "interested person" could seek affirmative
relief from the probate court.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1)

(1978); Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803.

Subsection 75-3-710(3) did

this by "otherwise providing" that the "scope" of a proceeding
on a personal representative's petition for approval of the
sale of estate property would be enlarged to permit "any person
(to) appear" and seek affirmative relief from the court (an
order requiring the personal representative to sell the estate
property to the non interested person).

But when Subsection

75-3-710(3) was repealed in 1983, the "scope" of the proceeding
was again restricted to how the personal representative framed
the prayer for relief.
In the present case, Mr. Perry prayed that the Court enter
an order approving the sale of the estate's property to the
Arnauds.

(R.42-43).

Thus, the scope of the proceeding was

limited to determining whether that prayer should be granted.
The probate court did not have the authority to entertain the
motion of a non interested party and to grant affirmative
relief to that party.
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C.

The Probate Court Misconstrued the Consequence of

Holding that the December 3/ 1985 Order was Void.

The probate court's failure to appreciate the significance
of the second sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3) caused the
court to erroneously rule that the court could continue to
entertain bids from non interested persons notwithstanding the
repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3).

Moreover, the court totally

misconstrued the consequences that would result from a contrary
holding (that the repeal of this subsection limited the probate
court's authority over petitions for the approval of the sale
of real property):
When the personal representative comes to Court
intentionally, or mistakenly under the statute, and
says, Judge, approve this sale for this third party,
you're seeking approval of the Court. . . . And I'm
telling you right now that as far as this Court's
concerned, and I suspect many of my colleagues would
feel the same way, and this is a matter I'll take up
in the Judges* meeting Wednesday next, that if a
personal representative seeks the approval, and all
the protections that run with it from this Court on a
sale of real, or personal, or any other kind of
property, and comes in with the proposition that
inquiry as to whether or not this is a good thing for
the estate. Don't find out whether there is something
that has more money to offer, whether or not it's a
good bargain or not. Then be advised that I will
never approve any personal representative sale of any
property under any circumstances, if those are the
limitations that are imposed upon me as a probate
judge.
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Judge Hanson's comments, Transcript of April 7th hearing
(R.362-363).

;

Contrary to Judge Hanson's comments, the repeal of

1

Subsection 75-3-710(3) does not prevent the probate court from
inquiring into the substance of the personal representative's
petition for approval.

|

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978).

The probate court can inquire as to whether anyone is willing
to offer a better price for the property.

If a non interested

party offers a better price, the probate court should consider
that offer in determining whether to grant or deny the personal
representative's petition.

Moreover, an interested person

I

could actually bid for the property, and the court could

;

require the personal representative to sell the property to

;

that person.

\

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978).

The only

limitation on the court, after the repeal of Subsection
75-3-710(3), is that the court is without authority to both
deny the personal representative's petition and require the
personal representative to sell the estate's property to a non
interested party.

Otherwise, the court continues to have full

power to investigate the personal representative's petition and
deny it if the court determines that it is not in the best
l

interest of the estate.

|
i
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III. MR. PERRY IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER VACATING THE
DECEMBER 3, 1985 ORDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT MR. PERRY
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COURT AT THE
TIME THE HEARING WAS HELD.

When the petition of Mr. Perry for approval of the sale of
Diane's home to the Arnauds was called on November 6, 1985 and
Kent and Carol McLaughlin made their bids for the property, Mr.
Perry did not raise any objection on the basis that the
McLaughlins were not interested persons. (R.369-386).

In

addition, Mr. Perry participated in the drafting of the
December 3, 1985 Order. (R.66-82).

Judge Hanson weighed the

equities between the parties and held that Mr. Perry waived any
jurisdictional defect because he failed to object at the time
of the November 6, 1985 Order or when the Order was executed.
(R.162-164). l

This is an erroneous view of the law.

Parties to a lawsuit

cannot consent to grant a court subject matter jurisdiction it

Counsel for Mr. Perry filed an affidavit with the court in
which he averred that he advised Judge Hanson of the repeal of
U.C.A. § 75-3-710(3) prior to the entry of the December 3, 1985
Order. (R.240).
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does not have.

Werner v. Ill, Cent. R.R., 379 111. 559, 42

N.E.2d 82 (1942); see also, 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1359 ("A [federal]
district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in
which any party . . . has been . . . collusively . . . joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.")

It follows, a_

fortiori, that one party's failure to object can never grant
subject matter jurisdiction to a court that the court otherwise
would not have.

Indeed,

Even the party which [sought and] obtained the void
judgment may collaterally attack it. . . .
A party attacking a judgment as void need show no
meritorious claim or defense or other equities on his
behalf; he is entitled to have the judgment treated
for what it is, a legal nullity, but he must establish
that the judgment is void.
7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 1f 60.25(2)
(2d. ed. 1985) (interpreting F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) —
identical to U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5)) (emphasis added).
Thus, Mr. Perry's failure to raise the objection of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion of Kent and
Carol McLaughlin cannot waive the subject matter jurisdictional
defect.

Since the December 3, 1985 Order was entered pursuant

to the motion of non interested persons and since the court's
jurisdiction is limited to hearing the motions of interested
persons, the order entered is void.

The order is a legal
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nullity and Mr. Perry is entitled to have it vacated.

7 J.

Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice If 60.25(2) (2d.
ed. 1985).

CONCLUSION

Mr. Perry respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
probate court's decision and remand the case to the probate
court with directions to enter an order vacating the December
3, 1985 Order.

Dated this

^

day of December, 1986

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

Charles M. Bennett
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Diane Laura
McLaughlin

CDN4402B
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

DEC -3 1995
H Du^2 Hintfey. Cferifferd CM St.Court
Coui
tt/
Deputy Clerk

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
W. Waldan Lloyd (A1985)
Charles M. Bennett (A0283)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry.
Personal Representative

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

[In the Matter of the Estate Of )
DIANE LAURA MCLAUGHLIN.
)

I
j

ORDER GRANTING SALE OF
REAL PROPERTY

)
Deceased.

'

)

Probate No. P-85-893

* * * * * * *

Hearing on the Petition for Approval of Sale of Home and
Sale of Furnishings filed by Eugene L. Perry, personal
Representative, on October 15. 1985. came on for hearing before
i

the above entitled Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson.
Probate Judge, on November 6. 1985. pursuant to notice.
[petitioner was represented by his attorney. Charles M. Bennett,
• i
i«

of the firm of Callister. Duncan & Nebeker; the former spouse
of the decedent and his spouse, Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin,
were present in person and represented by their attorney. E.H.
Fankhauser; and the Court, after review of the offer to
purchase the real property located at 902 East 8530 South.

-30-
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Sandy, Utah, submitted with the Petition of the Personal
Representative, called for higher and better bids; and Kent G.
and Carol McLaughlin, having submitted to the Court their offer
to purchase the real property and the furnishings which offer
was considered by the Court and compared with the offer
submitted with the Petition of the Personal Representative; and
the Court having made inquiry and having made comparison of the
offer submitted, being duly advised in the premises determined
that the offer of Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin is a better
offer than the offer submitted by the Personal Representative,
pursuant to Petition; how. therefore.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin

to purchase the real property located at 902 East 8530 South.
Sandy. Utah, pursuant to Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated
October 30. 1985 is approved and accepted by the Court.

2.

The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin

to purchase personal property consisting of furniture and
furnishings as set forth in the Schedule of Personal property

-31-
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on file herein, be and the same is hereby approved and accepted
by the Court.

3.

Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin are to pay to

the personal Representative the offered purchase price of
$63,000.00 for the real property described as.

All of Lot 305, FAIR OAKS NO. 3 SUBDIVISION
according to the official Plat on file in
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder,
State of Utah
as follows:

•

•

'

(a)

$500.00 which represents the Earnest Money

(b)

$18,500.00 representing the approximate balance

deposit;

of an existing mortgage to be assumed by the Buyer;

(c)

$2,561.61 representing the approximate balance of

Buyer's equity due to the buyer under a Decree of Divorce of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
(this sum to be determined exactly and adjusted at the time of
closing, pursuant to agreement dated January 10, 1984);

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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(d)

$41,438.33 representing the approximate balance

to be paid on closing on or before December 1, 1985 from loan
proceeds to be obtained by the Buyers.

As a part of the offer of Buyers, approved by the Court, Buyers
agree to be responsible to pay all financing costs and the cost
of a Title Insurance Policy, should a policy of insurance be
requested and issue.

4.

Buyers are to pay to the Personal Representative, on

or before December 1, 1985, in cash, the sum of $1,100.00
representing the purchase price for the personal property
(household furnishings).

5.

The equitable interest in and to the real property of

the Buyer, Kent G. McLaughlin, is to be determined exactly and
adjusted as to the amount at the time of closing.

6.

In the event the Buyers, Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol

McLaughlin, and Seller, Eugene Perry as Personal
Representative, are unable to agree to the amount of Mr.

-33-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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McLaughlin's lien against the home (paragraph 3(c) above),
further hearing on the lien issue is hereby reserved by the
Court.

/

Da t e d t h i s

S

day of

h^&wf&X1—

1985

'IMOTHY "ST. HANSON.
DISTRICT JUDGE

ATTEST
H.DW0NHWOL1Y

CDN6248M
By

Deputy Clerx
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING SALE OF REAL PROPERTY and MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER were mailed, postage fully prepaid this
27th day of November. 1985, to the following:

E. H. Fankhauser
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

Ju^Z^ >y£
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E. H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for McLaughlins
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

FILED IN v.cERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

MAR 1 2 1986
H. Dixon Hindley. Clerk 3rd Oist. Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

In the matter of the Estate Of .
DIANE LAURA McLAUGHLIN,
Deceased.

.
.
)

ORDER DENYING PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S AMENDED
PETITION TO AMEND ORDER
Probate No. . P 85-893
Judge Hanson

Hearing on the Personal Representative's Amended Petition
to Amend Order Granting Sale of Real Property came on for hearing
at a regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice,
Monday, February 10, 1986 before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
District Judge.

The Personal Representative was represented by

his attorney, Charles M. Bennett. Kent and Carol McLaughlin were
present in Court in person and represented by their attorney,
E. H. Fankhauser.

The matter was argued and submitted to the

Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, having
taken the matter under advisement, reviewed the file, considered
the arguments of counsel and having rendered its Memorandum
Decision herein, and being otherwise fully advised; enters the
following:
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Personal
Representatives Amended Petition to Amend Order Granting Sale
of Real Property dated December 3, 1985, pursuant to Rule 6OB
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, be and the same is hereby
denied in accordance with the Memorandum Decision of this Court.
The oral Motion of the Personal Representative to
enter an Order, should the Court disallow the relief requested,
in conformance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and to certify this matter under Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, be and the same is hereby denied in accordance with
the Memorandum Decision of this Court, without prejudice to the
Personal Representative to seek such an Order from the current
Probate

Judge, should the Personal Representative chose to do so,
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

/ " 2 ^ da/of March, 1986.

[ H o r a r y riANSOU
)ISTRICT JUDGE

ATTEST
H.DW0NHtt40LEY
/-Mark
&*»tfy CJ%'V
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed to Charles M. Bennett, Attorney for Personal Representative,
in accordance with Rule 2.9 of Rules of Practice, addressed to
him at Suite 800, Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
postage prepaid, on

this

Y^~~

day

°

f i,iarch

»

i986

«
cuu^<
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Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry,
Personal Representative
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
DIANE LAURA MCLAUGHLIN,
Deceased

ORDER DENYING PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S RULE
RULE 59(a) PETITION
EXCEPT AS TO RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION
Probate No. P - 85 - 893

* * * * * * *

The Petition of the Personal Representative to amend the
. Court Order of March 12, 1986, pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)
came before the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on
April 7, 1986, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding.

The

Personal Representative was represented by his attorney,
i Charles M. Bennett.

Kent McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin

appeared in person and were represented by their attorney, E.
H. Fankhauser.

The Court heard the arguments of counsel,

reviewed the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the
respective parties, and otherwise was fully advised in the
premises.

As a result, the Court determined that the Court's
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:

Order of March 12, 1986 was proper.

^

The Court turther

determined that there is no just cause for delaying the
finality of the March 12, 1986 Order, that the elements of the
Pate v. Marathon Steel case have been met by the Personal
Representative's Rule 54(b) Motion and that the Court's March
12, 1986 Order should be supplemented accordingly.

Now,

therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Rule 54(b) Petition of the
Personal Representative be and the same is hereby granted and
the March 12, 1986 Order is hereby certified as a final order
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except for the Rule 54(b)
certification, the Rule 59(a) Petition of the Personal
Representative be and the same is hereby denied
Dated this

/

day-of t^yjLusU

, 1986.

'iWOTfi? R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
A —

CDN3743B

>•
=%

By — ^ V ^ £ ^ 2 ^ ^ < g g ^ ^ - ^
l~*

J
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Exhibit No. 4
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20) (1978)
75-1-201.

General Definitions —

...

(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees,
children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others
having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person which may
be affected by the proceeding. It also includes persons having
priority for appointment as personal representative and other
fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and
must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and
matters involved in, any proceeding.
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Exhibit No. 5
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978)
75-1-302.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction -- . . .

(2) The court has full power to make orders, judgments,
and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to
administer justice in the matters which come before it.
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Exhibit No. 6
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (1978)
75-3-105. Proceedings affecting devolution and
administration—Jurisdiction of subject matter. -- (1) Persons
interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this
chapter and may petition the court for orders in formal
proceedings within the court's jurisdiction, including, but not
limited to those described in this chapter. The court may hear
and determine formal proceedings involving administration and
distribution of decedent's estates after notice to interested
persons in conformity with section 75-1-401. Persons notified
are bound though less than all interested persons may have been
given notice.
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Exhibit No. 7
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-704 (1978)
75-3-704. Personal representative to proceed without court
order—Exception. -- A personal representative shall proceed
expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a
decedent's estate and, except as otherwise specified or ordered
in regard to a supervised personal representative or in regard
to a restriction placed on the disposition of real property
under subsection 75-3-710 (2), do so without adjudication,
order, or direction of the court, but he may invoke the
jurisdiction of the court in proceedings authorized by this
code, to resolve questions concerning the estate or its
administration.
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Exhibit No. 8
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983)
75-3-710. Powers of personal representatives--In
general—Exceptions—Hearings. -- . . .
(3) The personal representative may petition the court for
an order approving any sale or other matter affecting any
property of the estate which is made subject to court
approval. After notice to all interested persons and the
hearing, at which if the transaction is a sale, any person may
appear and bid for the property being sold, the court shall
enter such order as appears to be in the best interests of the
estate. If a person interested in the estate bids for such
property, he may request that his interest in the estate be
offset against the purchase price.
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Exhibit No. 9
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983)
Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or Order. . . .
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has
not been personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said
action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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Exhibit No. 10
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1985)
Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order . . .
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representatiave from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons, (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to
grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as
provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the
nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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Exhibit No. 11
Editorial Board Comment to LLC.A. §75-3-106
This section and others in Chapter 3 describe a system of
administration of decedents' estates which gives interested
persons control of whether matters relating to estates will
become occasions for judicial orders. Sections 75-3-501
through 75-3-505 describe supervised administration, a judicial
proceeding which is continuous throughout administration. It
corresponds with the theory of administration of decedents'
estates which prevails in may states. See, section 62, Model
Probate Code. If supervised administration is not requested,
persons interested in an estate may use combinations of the
formal proceedings (order by judge after notice to persons
concerned with the relief sought), informal proceedings
(request for the limited response that nonjudicial personnel of
the probate court are authorized to make in response to
verified application) and filings provided in the remaining
parts of Chapter 3 to secure authority and protection needed to
administer the estate. Nothing except self-interest will
compel resort to the judge. When resort to the judge is
necessary or desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain
protection, the scope of the proceeding if not otherwise
prescribed by the Code is framed by the petition. The securing
of necessary jurisdiction over interested persons in a formal
proceeding is facilitated by sections 75-3-105 and 75-3-602.
Section 75-3-201 locates venue for all proceedings at the place
where the first proceeding occurred.
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Exhibit No. 12
Editorial Board Comment to U.C.A. §75-3-704

This section is intended to confer authority on the
personal representative to initiate a proceeding at any time
when it is necessary to resolve a question relating to
administration. Section 75-3-105 grants broad subject matter
jurisdiction to the probate court which covers a proceeding
initiated for any purpose other than those covered by more
explicit provisions dealing with testacy proceedings,
proceedings for supervised administration, proceedings
concerning disputed claims and proceedings to close estates.
(The Utah version omits section 3-705 of the official text
pertaining to the duty of a personal representative to give
information of his appointment to heirs and devisees.)
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully
prepaid this £-3r<?/day of December, 1986, to the following:
E. H. Fankhauser
660 South 200 East
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

%X
CDN4483B
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